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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks review of a decision by the Utah Career Service 
Review Board entered June 28,2006 (Addendum at Attachment 1), and its denial of 
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration dated July 27,2006 (Addendum at Attachment 2 
hereto). 
JURISDICTION 
By this Petition, Petitioner seeks review of orders issued by the Utah Career 
Service Review Board ("CSRB"), an administrative body created under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19(a)-201. The CSRB ruling followed a formal adjudicative proceeding, upholding 
Mr. Blauer's termination from his employment as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III for the 
Utah State Department of Workforce Services, despite his physical and psychological 
inability to perform the duties which he had been reassigned in retaliation for challenging 
a performance evaluation. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-
3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether CSRB erroneously interpreted or applied the law in determining 
that DWS properly terminated Petitioner's employment with the state for failure to return 
to work within one year after the last day worked, even though it made no effort to place 
him in the best available, vacant position which he qualifies, and for which he was able to 
perform the essential functions notwithstanding physical or psychological disability. 
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2. Whether CSRB erred in finding that the propriety of DWS' termination 
decision concerning Petitioner was supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before it; specifically: 
(a) whether Petitioner was properly determined to be disabled, within the 
meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act, solely for "psychopathological 
illness"; 
(b) whether DWS presented any evidence whatever establishing that, at the 
time of his termination, Petitioner was unable to perform the "essential functions" 
of his prior position as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III (as such functions had been 
established by custom and practice over 23 years), or that such position was not 
available for him at that time; 
(c) whether DWS presented any evidence whatever to suggest that, at any 
time, DWS made any effort to place Petitioner in the best available, vacant 
position for which he qualified, and of which he was able to perform the essential 
functions without reasonable accommodation, despite his disability; 
(d) whether DWS presented any evidence in the record that Petitioner was 
obliged, prior to his termination, to establish his ability to return to work with a 
medical release. 
3. Whether this Petition was untimely. 
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The standard of review for Issues 1 and 3 is de novo review for correct application 
and interpretation of the law - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Tasters Limited, Inc. 
v. Department of Employment Security, 863 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1993); cert denied 878 
P.2dll54. 
Issue 2 is reviewed for support by substantial evidence viewed in light of the 
whole record before the Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); the 
decision is sustainable only if reasonable minds would accept as adequate the quantum of 
evidence necessary to support the conclusion. Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 Utah 
App. 67,44 P.3d 819, cert, denied 48 P.3d 797. 
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Federal Statutory Provisions 
42 U.S.C.,§ 12101, etseq. 
2. State Statutory and Administrative Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a) and (3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-407 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-408 
Utah Administrative Code, R477-7-17(3)(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Lorin Blauer, filed an appeal on November 16,2005, from the 
decision of the DWS Executive Director dated November 3,2004 which terminated his 
employment. A Step 5 evidentiary hearing was conducted by a hearing officer for the 
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Career Service Review Board, on August 18 and 19,2005. The hearing officer issued his 
decision denying appellant's appeal on September 19, 2005. The appellant filed his 
appeal to the Career Service Review Board on September 28,2005. CSRB issued its 
decision on June 28, 2006, denying Mr. Blauer's appeal (Addendum at Attachment 1) and 
holding that his termination had been proper notwithstanding DWS' failure to afford him 
proper reinstatement to his prior job responsibilities as required by rule. CSRB denied 
Mr. Blauer's Request to Reconsider by order dated July 27, 2006 (Addendum at 
Attachment 2). Mr. Blauer filed his Petition for Review with this Court on August 1, 
2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Petitioner began working for the Department of Employment Security 
(now Department of Workforce Services; hereinafter referred to as DWS) on a temporary 
basis in 1980. R. 894 at 161:21-25,162:1-5. 
2. In September, 1981, Mr. Blauer achieved merit status as Legal Counsel. Id. 
3. Mr. Blauer worked for the department for 23 years as Legal Counsel (now 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III). R. 894 at 218:24-25. 
4. Membership in the Utah State Bar was a required qualification of the job. 
R. 894 at 221:3-6, Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895). 
5. Mr. Blauer's initial responsibilities as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III 
included researching legal issues and writing legal opinions for the department; advising 
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Appeals Referees (now Administrative Law Judge-DWS or Administrative Law Judge -
Non Juris Doctorate); when they had legal issues arise in the course of a hearing and 
requested a legal opinion; advising the Board of Review (now Workforce Appeals Board) 
regarding factual and legal issues raised in appeals from decisions of Department 
Administrative Law Judges; writing decisions for the Board and defending those 
decisions with legal briefs to and oral arguments in the Utah Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals. R. 894 at 219:5 through 221:2, Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895). 
6. In 1986, Mr. Blauer was temporarily assigned to hold hearings as a 
Department Appeals Referee as a voluntary reassignment mutually agreed upon according 
to rules (later changed to Administrative Law Judge - Non Juris Doctorate and referred to 
hereinafter as ALJ) so that he would have a better feel for what that job entailed. This 
would help him in his job as Legal Counsel since his job was to review decisions of the 
ALJs and advise the Board as to whether the ALJs had made errors in their decisions or in 
their fact finding processes. R 894 at 218:25 through 219:14,221:10-24, Appellant's 
Exhibit 1 (R. 786, 895). Though the name of the ALJ position has changed, the 
responsibilities have not changed in any significant way. The job does not now require, 
nor has it ever required, a law degree. R. 894 at 223:1-23,239:9-12, 336:18 through 
341:20, 343:21 through 344:5, Appellant's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789, 895) 
7. Over the last five years of the Petitioner's performance of his duties, and 
indeed for essentially most of Mr. Blauer's career, the duties of acting as Legal Counsel 
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to the Workforce Appeals Board comprised 50 percent of his job responsibilities as 
defined by his Position Description Questionnaire. R. 894 at 225:16 through 226:22. 
8. Mr. Blauer was also legal counsel to the Contributions Unit of the 
Department, representing them in court garnishment and collection matters, in bankruptcy 
matters and in needed legal opinions. He reviewed sub plans and contracts for the 
department. Id. 
9. Further, Mr. Blauer served on a prosecution board to decide with the other 
members whether certain cases met the requirements for referring to the County 
Attorney's office for prosecution, and then referred those cases to the County Attorney. 
He served under the title "Special Assistant Attorney General" as authorized by the 
Attorney General's Office. Id. 
10. Mr. Blauer was also the Information Disclosure Attorney whose 
responsibility it was to advise the internal auditor, John Levanger. Together, 
Mr. Levanger and Mr. Blauer would make the determination, upon receipt of requests for 
disclosure on issues of disclosure agreements relative to department records, whether 
providing the information would or would not have a chilling effect on employers in 
filing their reports or claimants filing their claims. Id. 
11. Mr. Blauer also was responsible for responding to subpoenas. On 
numerous occasions he appeared and opposed subpoenas for the department's 
information, in both State and Federal Court. R. 894 at 226:23 through 227:2. 
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12. All of the above responsibilities are listed on Mr. Blauer's job description 
(i.e., Position Description Questionnaire, hereinafter PDQ) because they were essential to 
the purpose of his position. Holding unemployment insurance hearings, though, is not a 
task listed on the DHRMJob Description for Legal/Enforcement Counsel III; neither was 
the holding of unemployment insurance hearings a task ever listed on any PDQ issued in 
connection with Mr. Blauer fs position. Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895); 
Appellant's Exhibit 2 (R. 787, 895). 
13. However, holding hearings is a task listed on the DHRM Job Description 
for Administrative Law Judge-DWS (same as Administrative Law Judge-non juris 
Doctorate so also hereinafter referred to as ALJ). Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789, 
895). 
14. Holding hearings was never a part of Mr. Blauer's regular assignments as 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III; nor was he asked to do it as a temporary or special 
assignment ("other duties as assigned") for 18 of the 23 years Mr. Blauer served as Legal 
Counsel. It has never appeared on his PDQ or his official DHRM job description. 
Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895); Appellant's Exhibit 2 (R. 787, 895); 
Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789, 895). 
15. Sometime during her tenure as Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Virginia (Ginger) 
Smith, (who preceded Tani Downing as Mr. Blauer's supervisor) temporarily assigned 
Mr. Blauer to conduct two hearings a week as a "special assignment." According to his 
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PDQ, special assignments may comprise 10% of his workload. Two hearings a week 
would be just that - 10%. R. 894 at 242:11-22,243:20-24,246:3-13, Appellant's Exhibit 
2 (R. 787, 895). Occasionally Mr. Blauer conducted more hearings if an ALJ was ill or 
had scheduling conflicts. During this time, Mr. Blauer in order to be a helpful team 
player had no problems or objections to holding such hearings. R. 894 at 242:23 through 
243:10. 
16. About a year after becoming Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Tani Downing 
incrementally increased the number of hearings assigned to Mr. Blauer from two cases to 
eight cases per week. R. 894 at 251:8-15. Mr. Blauer experienced physical difficulty 
conducting eight hearings a week because the long periods of sitting exacerbated his 
sciatic nerve problem (see below), causing, as stated by his physician, severe "distracting 
pain". R. 894 at 252:13-23. 
17. Mr. Blauer consulted Doctors Perry Lofthouse and Dennis Peterson about 
his sciatic nerve problem. He was advised he should not be sitting or standing still for 
more than 20-30 minutes at a time. Mr. Blauer conveyed this information to Ms. 
Downing. Rather than accommodating Mr. Blauer's physical limitations, she actually 
increased his hearing assignments to 20 cases a week (a full time work load for an ALJ) 
which would have effectively crippled the Claimant. R. 893 at 111:13-22; R. 894 at 
252:24 through 253:18. 
18. According to Mr. Blauer's personal physician, Dr. Dennis R. Peterson (R 
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894 atl63:l 1-13,164:11-12), in June of 2003, Mr. Blauer "had fairly severe sciatica or 
pain radiating from the low back and sacral region through the buttocks down the left 
lateral leg to the knee, then down to the—the lateral foreleg, into the foot. There was some 
numbness in the dorsum of the left foot". R 894 at 166:1-16. The pain was caused by 
generalized degeneration of the lower spine resulting in an impingement on the nerves 
coming from the lower spine and down that region. He had been dealing with this for 
some time fairly successfully but now it was in extreme exacerbation. R 894 at 167:21 
through 167:25. 
19. The cause of the exacerbation was "an increase in seated work" which is 
"something that intensified the pain, that tends to stretch the nerve around the comer of 
the hip or the buttock and pulls .. .the nerve into contact." Standing stationary, especially 
in cases of spinal stenosis such as Petitioner's, "will make that worse". R 894 at 168:1 
through 169:3. 
20. Dr. Peterson was aware of Mr. Blauer's duties as Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III and that those duties were changed to holding administrative hearings in 
midyear of 2003. He knew that "sitting and running hearings.. .had disabled" Petitioner. 
Mr. Blauer has since undergone major surgery in an attempt to correct this problem - a 
problem exacerbated by the assignment of Ms. Downing during which surgery he nearly 
lost the use of his legs. R. 894 at 192:21 through 193:24. 
21. Mr. Blauer was constrained by the foregoing physical disability to go on 
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medical leave on October 8,2003. R. 893 at 10:23-25. He applied for long term 
disability on January 26,2004 (Agency's Exhibit 1, R. 798, 895), and was approved for 
long term disability on July 14,2004 (Agency's Exhibits 4 and 5, R. 808, 895). 
22. Prior to being approved for long term disability, Mr. Blauer's 
Administrative Representative, Tom Cantrell, hand-delivered to Ms. Downing a letter 
from Mr. Blauer dated June 4,2004, wherein he requested that he "be allowed to return to 
work to perform my historical duties as Legal Counsel within the medical parameters that 
has been certified by Dr. Peterson who has cleared me for work as Legal Counsel but not 
for Administrative Law Judge". Petitioner's Exhibit 21, R. 792, 895. 
23. In order to determine whether Mr. Blauer should be granted long term 
disability, the Long-Term Disability Program arranged for an Independent Psychological 
Evaluation of Petitioner by Darrell H. Hart, Ph.D. As a part of his evaluation, Dr. Hart 
reviewed Mr. Blauer's medical information. He details the recommendations given to 
DWS by Doctors Dennis R. Peterson and Perry Lofthouse in behalf of Mr. Blauer to 
enable him to work effectively. Agency Exhibit 2 (R. 799-805, 895), pages 2 and 3. Dr. 
Hart noted on page 13 of his evaluation that:"[Petitioner] is indeed suffering from 
psychopathology..." and "The condition does cause a total inability to perform his normal 
work as assigned in midyear 2003. If there were significant accommodations made 
which would include modification of the workload and if [Petitioner] had a different 
supervisor, I would predict his level of depression and anxiety drop from moderate/severe 
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to mild. If that were the case, he could perform the functions and tasks associated with 
modified accommodations at the level of adequacy which he had performed in the pas f9 
(italics added). Id. 
24. Dr. Peterson advised Mr. Blauer's attorney, Vince Rampton, in 2004 that 
Mr. Blauer could perform the essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. 
25. Attorney Rampton then advised the department in a letter dated October 4, 
2004 that Mr. Blauer was able and available to return to his position as Legal Counsel III 
if such position was available. R. 894 at 172:3 through 174:5. 
26. The department responded in a letter dated October 8,2004 stating that the 
position was available but only with duties assigned at the discretion of management. 
Agency Exhibit 6 (R. 895). This clearly meant, in the context of Mr. Rampton's letter 
and the department's response, and their position regularly communicated both verbally 
and in writing that Mr. Blauer would be expected to hold unemployment hearings full 
time - a prospect fully admitted by Tani Downing on the stand (R. I l l :2-23). 
27. Scott Steele, who conducted the Petitioner's informal Step 4 hearing on 
behalf of the Executive Director, testified that Mr. Blauer had notified DWS that "he was 
able to return to work if he could identify what he could do and the extent of what his job 
would be." R. 893 at 63:22-25. Mr. Steele testified that, to his understanding, Mr. Blauer 
was offered the job of "...Legal Counsel III... That was a job that had multiple parts to 
that job of duties that could be assigned in accordance with the performance plan of that 
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job. One of those duties was to conduct hearings. And - he was being offered that 
position to come back and conduct hearings. ..I believe that they said his primary job 
duties would be to be (sic) conduct hearings". R. 893 at 66:23 through 68:3. 
28. Mr. Blauer's employment was terminated by letter dated November 3,2004 
(Agency Exhibit 7, R. 895). In its letter, DWS made no mention whatever of Mr. 
Blauer's offer to return to work with reasonable accommodation, as set out in his 
counsel's letter (which was not mentioned in the November 3 letter at all), and no 
mention of failure to furnish a medical release. Id. 
29. DWS offered no reason for termination of Mr. Blauer's employment, other 
than Utah Administrative Code R477-7-17(l)(3)(a), (b) and (c). R. 893 at 38:16 through 
39:1; Agency Exhibit 6 (R. 895). In deciding to terminate Mr. Blauer's employment 
DWS Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that she was not 
qualified to speak to the question of what constituted the "essential functions" of 
positions within DWS - "I do not do the ADA work. We have a separate ADA 
coordinator that handles that and determines essential functions." R. 893 at 46:13-17. 
30. Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that 
termination of Mr. Blauer's employment after one year of absence was not mandated -
that circumstances existed where the time period was flexible. R. 893 at 51:4-21. 
31. In imposing the requirement that Petitioner come back to work solely to 
conduct hearings (which his physical disabilities prohibited him from doing), Tani 
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Downing (General Counsel and Director of the Division of Adjudication for DWS, and 
Mr. Blauer's superior) was aware that, over the course of his career, Mr. Blauer had acted 
as legal counsel concerned with collections, information disclosure and contract review. 
R. 893 at 83:2-9. 
32. DWS (Tani Downing in collaboration with Jo Anne Campbell) determined 
to terminate Mr. Blauer's employment based on his representation that, while he could 
and would return as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, he could not conduct hearings full 
time - a restriction which DWS unilaterally determined that Mr. Blauer would not be 
allowed to make: 
"Well, sir, the question was whether he was offered the same job. My 
understanding was that the department communicated that his legal counsel 
III position job was still available but that he would have to perform 
whatever duties within that job he was assigned, and that he could not select 
his supervisor." 
R. 893 at 96:5-11. 
33. Tani Downing communicated to Jo Anne Campbell (and Jo Anne Campbell 
communicated to Mr. Blauer) that, while he could return to work as Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III, "he would have to be willing to come back and take any of those 
assignments". R. 893 at 110:7-9; Agency Exhibit 5 (R. 895). See also R. 893 at 113:21 
through 114:5. 
34. In hearing, DWS acknowledged that Mr. Blauer had attempted, through a 
letter from his counsel, to explain that while he was willing to come back as 
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Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, there were physical limitations on what aspects of that 
job he could perform with or without reasonable accommodation. In her testimony, 
however, Tani Downing openly admitted to rejecting the imposition of any such condition 
or limitation: 
"There was a letter back from Mr. Blauer's attorney, I believe, saying he'll 
do it but only under these conditions. She came to me and asked me if 
that-you know, what I-what I thought of that. And I said, 'no. He needs to 
be coming back without being able to specify duties or supervisor at all.'" 
R. 893 at 114:24 through 115:6. 
35. In extending the offer to Petitioner to return to work, therefore, DWS 
contemplated that he would come back in order to do the same job he had done on the last 
day of his employment (the full-time holding of administrative hearings). R. 893 at 
117:15-22. 
36. Since this matter has been pending, DWS has claimed that it relied, in part, 
on Mr. Blauer's failure to furnish a "medical release" incident to his agreement to return 
to work. However, (1) Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that, 
where job functions upon return did not entail the disability for which disability relief had 
been offered, no such medical release would necessarily be required (R. 893 at 55:1-21); 
and (2) failure to produce a medical release was not given as a reason for termination 
(Agency Exhibit 6, R. 895). 
37. With respect to marshaling evidence supporting the ruling of the Career 
Services Review Board herein, DWS offered the following: 
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A. Testimony of DWS' Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell 
that she terminated Mr. Blauer's employment effective November 8, 2004, pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code R477-7-17(l) and (3)(a), (b) and (c), when he attempted to 
impose conditions upon his return, due to personal disability (R. 893 at 9:18 through 56:9 
and Agency Exhibits 1-7 (R. 895)); 
B. Ms. Campbell further testified that Mr. Blauer had been granted 
long-term disability benefits by reason of "psychological illness" (Agency Exhibit 4, R. 
895), and that he did not furnish a medical release. Mr. Blauer's counsel's letter was 
apparently inadequate for DWS, even though (1) no correspondence notified Mr. Blauer 
that any particular release was required, or that the letter from counsel was insufficient, 
and (2) failure to provide a medical release is not listed in his termination letter as a factor 
in termination-Agency Exhibits 3-7 (R. 895)); 
C. While Mr. Blauer agreed to come back to work, he attempted to 
impose conditions on his return by reason of personal disability - something which is 
superior, Tani Downing, flatly refused to let him do (R. 893 at 114:24 through 115:6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner Lorin Blauer was entitled, at the conclusion of his leave period, to rights 
set out at R477-7-17(3), Utah Admin. Code: 
Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include: 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day 
worked, the agency shall place the employee in the previously held position 
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or similar position in a comparable salary range provided the employee is 
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a 
reasonable accommodation. 
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the 
position because of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under 
the ADA, the agency shall offer the employee a reassignment to one or 
more immediately available vacant positions, for which the employee 
qualifies, and whose essential functions the employee is able to perform 
without a reasonable accommodation. 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last 
day worked, the employee shall be separated from state employment. 
As Mr. Blauer, his administrative representative, his legal representative and his health 
care providers had notified DWS on numerous occasions, he was fully capable of 
resuming, at the conclusion of his leave period or at any other time, his traditional, 
historic duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, but could not, for both physiological 
and psychological reasons, do administrative hearings to the extent required by DWS and 
to the exclusion of all else. His legal counsel reiterated these facts in response to DWS' 
October, 2004 communications concerning his return following the leave period. But 
DWS - for reasons which it did not even attempt to explain to the Hearing Officer -
determined that, alone among all Legal/ Enforcement Counsel employed by DWS, Mr. 
Blauer must do 100% administrative hearings or nothing. The only offered explanation 
of its position was that supervisor Tani Downing was not about to have Mr. Blauer dictate 
the terms of his employment. 
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In upholding the Hearing Officer's findings, conclusions and order, CSRB 
disregarded completely the requirements of subdivision (b) of R477-7-17(3), concluding 
that because Mr. Blauer had failed to demonstrate re-employability under the standards of 
subdivision (a) thereof, his termination was justified under subdivision (c). 
Evidence submitted failed to offer even marginal, much less substantial, support 
for CSRB's ruling. CSRB's analysis rested in significant part on the assertion that Mr. 
Blauer's long-term disability was for "psychopathalogical reasons" - ignoring completely 
uncontroverted testimony that he was also suffering from physiological disability which 
prevented his acceptance of an assignment confining him to full-time administrative 
hearings. CSRB similarly ignored the facts that - again by uncontroverted testimony -
Mr. Blauer was fully capable, both physically and psychologically, of re-assuming his 
prior duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, so long as hearings were not the sum and 
substance of his job; that DWS made no effort to determine whether his request in this 
regard could be accommodated; that DWS made no showing that the holding of hearings 
full-time was an "essential function" of the position under governing ADA regulations as 
adopted under DHRM rule; or that DWS made no attempt to find other, immediately-
vacant positions the essential functions of which Mr. Blauer couId perform without 
reasonable accommodation. His termination was therefore unjustified. 
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This petition, finally, is not untimely. It was pursued within 30 days of CSRB's 
final action on Mr. Blauer's request for reconsideration, and the timeliness of that request 
places no limitations on the jurisdiction of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CSRB ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
GOVERNING LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT DWS PROPERLY 
TERMINATED PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT FOR FAILURE 
TO RETURN TO WORK WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE LAST 
DAY WORKED. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the evidence was clear - and in fact 
uncontroverted - that Mr. Blauer was terminated from his employment based on DWS' 
discretionary application of a policy terminating employees after one year of long-term 
disability, where the employees are unable to return to work at that time. 
But where an employee is disabled, yet able to return to work under certain 
conditions, DWS' authority to terminate the employee was, in October of 2004, restricted 
by operation of R477-7-17(3): 
Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include: 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day 
worked, the agency shall place the employee in the previously held position 
or similar position in a comparable salary range provided the employee is 
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a 
reasonable accommodation. 
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the 
position because of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under 
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the ADA, the agency shall offer the employee a reassignment to one or 
more immediately available vacant positions, for which the employee 
qualifies, and whose essential functions the employee is able to perform 
without a reasonable accommodation. 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last 
day worked, the employee shall be separated from state employment.1 
In upholding Petitioner's termination, the CSRB reviewed the hearing examiner's 
findings (and the evidence underlying those findings) against the legal standard 
articulated by subsection (a) of the foregoing provision-fet// completely omitted from its 
decision the language or impact of subsection (b). At pages 16-19 of its June 28,2006, 
Decision and Final Agency Action (R871-874), entitled "Legal Issues Regarding the 
Department's Termination of Appellant's Employment for Failure to Return to Work 
Within One Year as Required by DHRM Rule R477-7-17", CSRB quoted subsection (a) 
of R477-7-17(3), concluded that because Petitioner had not established (and 
documented - see Point 11(C), below) that he was "able to return to work" (i.e., able to go 
back and perform administrative law hearings full-time, the job change which had 
resulted in his disability to begin with), and since DWS was entitled, in its discretion, to 
structure his job responsibilities any way it chose, regardless of disability, it was justified 
in firing him under subsection (c). Id. 
!R477-7-17(3) has since been amended to eliminate express reference to the ADA, 
although a state employee's right to be placed in a position the essential functions of 
which he/she can perform with or without reasonable accommodation has been preserved. 
770966v2 19 
CSRB's evaluation of the evidence, like that of the hearing officer's, was 
fundamentally flawed - see Point II, below. As a threshold issue, however, it must be 
observed that it occurred in the context of an erroneous legal standard. Subsection (b) of 
R477-7-17(3) imposed an alternate reinstatement standard - one which, by its express 
terms, invokes the language and standards adopted pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C., § 12101, et seq. As more fully discussed at Point II(B.), 
below, ADA standards invoke a factual analysis very different from that relied on by the 
Hearing Officer, and CSRB on review. 
Simply put, Petitioner notified DWS, immediately prior to his termination, that he 
could not, by reason of disability
 y return to the responsibilities to which he had been 
assigned immediately prior to his departure: the holding of administrative law hearings 
full-time. He notified them, however, that he could return to the position of 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III as he had performed it for over 20 years, conducting some 
hearings, but performing other job duties as well. This, however, Ms. Downing flatly 
rejected - "He needs to be coming back without being able to specify duties or 
supervisors at all." (R893 at 114:24 through 115:6). This "my way or the highway" 
attitude was, in the mind of DWS and its personnel, the sum and substance of what 
"reasonable accommodation" was due Petitioner, on pain of termination. 
The language of the law plainly demonstrates that DWS was required to do more 
than this. It was required to offer Petitioner a reassignment to one or more immediately 
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available vacant positions - positions for which he qualified, and the essential functions 
of which he could perform without a reasonable accommodation. The record is utterly 
devoid of any sign that either the Hearing Officer or CSRB imposed such a legal standard 
on DWS. Nowhere was DWS (which bore the burden of proof in this matter) put to the 
task of coming forward with evidence that it took any effort to analyze Petitioner's 
disability status, compared against available vacant positions for which he was otherwise 
qualified, and make any determination of where he could be reassigned. Worse still, 
DWS completely disregarded - without any justification appearing anywhere in the 
record - Petitioner's own suggestion that he simply be permitted to return as 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III with the same or similar mix of duties and responsibilities 
which had been entrusted to him over the course of more than two decades. DWS' 
personnel freely admitted that they dismissed this suggestion out of hand, hiding behind 
definitions and descriptions contained in DHRM regulations to conclude that, in order to 
be "able to return to work" (a standard under subsection (a), not subsection (b)), 
Petitioner had to demonstrate himself able to perform all functions (and especially all 
"core functions" in whatever proportions DWS dictated, apparently) falling within the job 
description of the position in question. This, concluded CSRB, was all that was 
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incumbent upon DWS when faced with Petitioner's offer to return to work under 
conditions that would accommodate his disability.2 
The language of R477-7-17(3)(b), and the ADA-mandated legal standards which it 
incorporates by reference, required far more of DWS than it afforded to Petitioner. In its 
stretch to uphold DWS' decision, though, CSRB shifted its focus to a separate legal 
standard - one which, under the undisputed facts of this matter, did not apply in 
Petitioner's case. On this basis alone, CSRB's decision, and that of its hearing examiner, 
constituted an erroneous interpretation of governing law, and mandates reversal. 
2It is illuminating that, having rubber-stamped DWS' position in this regard, CSRB 
dismissed Petitioner's observation that his "reassignment" to perform administrative law 
hearings full-time was the functional equivalent of being made an administrative law 
judge out of hand, labeling it "sophistic") (R871). To the contrary, it was DWS' line of 
reasoning which was "sophistic" - (1) to qualify for reinstatement, Petitioner needed to be 
able to perform all functions falling under the heading of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III 
(or whatever mix of those functions DWS, in its sole and unfettered discretion, saw fit to 
impose upon him, with full knowledge of his disability); (2) the holding of administrative 
law hearings constituted a "core function" under the job description of 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III (even though, in practice, Petitioner had never been 
required to devote more than a small fraction of his time to the conducting of such 
hearings before being abruptly reassigned to hold hearings full-time by his supervisor, a 
decision which created his disability to begin with); and (3) because he could not do what 
he was told and hold administrative law hearings full-time, his termination was justified 
without any further effort at reasonable accommodation. 
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POINT II 
THE CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT DWS' TERMINATION OF 
PETITIONER WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RECORD BEFORE IT. 
In holding Mr. Blauer to the standard imposed by R477-7- 17(a) (not (b), as 
discussed under Point I), the CSRB affirmed the Findings of Fact entered by the Hearing 
Officer to the effect that (1) Mr. Blauer suffered solely from a "psychopathological 
illness", which, because it had been relied upon in extending long-term disability to him, 
was the sole basis of his "disability," and (2) his offer to return to work was not supported 
by medical documentation that his "psychopathological illness" had ameliorated to any 
degree. See R. 871. 
In fact, the CSRB's opinion (like the Findings of Fact entered by the Hearing 
Officer) completely skirts the issue. First, Mr. Blauer suffered from both physical and 
psychological disabilities. Second, neither of these prevented him from doing the 
"essential functions" of the position which he had held for 23 years — with or without 
reasonable accommodation (maintenance of his historic duties), he could perform - and 
had been performing - the "essential functions" of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as 
those functions had been established by long practice. Third, Mr. Blauer's failure to 
furnish a medical release concerning the foregoing was an afterthought — it was not 
required of him as part of any pre-termination communication, and was not listed as a 
reason for his termination. 
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A. The Petitioner was not properly determined to be disabled, within the 
meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act, solely for 
"psychopathological illness". 
Mr. Blauer does indeed suffer a disability as defined under the American's with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), but not limited to that addressed by the Hearing Officer or 
CSRB. In the second sentence of paragraph 6 of his Findings of Fact, the Hearing Officer 
states: "Dr. Hart concluded that Grievant suffered from psychopathological illness, and 
that Grievant's condition was sufficiently severe to cause a total inability to perform his 
normal work as assigned." This statement is accurate, but incomplete. The balance of 
Dr. Hart's statement is:"... as assigned in mid year 2003." Agency's Exhibit 2, R. 895, 
page 13, paragraph 2. As assigned prior to that time, Mr. Blauer was fully capable of 
performing the essential functions of his job as set by longstanding practice. 
Dr. Hart's conclusion in his Independent Psychological Evaluation that Grievant is 
unable to hold unemployment insurance hearings full time but could perform his regular 
duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III was fully supported by the testimony of 
Grievant's personal physician, Dr. Dennis R. Peterson that physiologically Grievant is 
unable to hold hearings full time but could perform his regular historical duties as 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. Dr. Peterson testified at length concerning Grievant's 
sciatica, mini-traumatic stress disorder, numbness in the lower extremities and feet, 
arising generally from degeneration of the lower spine and impingement on the spinal 
column - all in a state of severe exacerbation during mid-2003 (R. 894 at 163:11 through 
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168:5). Dr. Peterson concluded that the exacerbation of Grievant's condition derived 
from increased sitting and stationary standing. (R. 894 at 168:1-22) Dr. Peterson testified 
that Appellant was physically disabled as a result of holding hearings (R. 894 at 
192:21-25). His testimony stood uncontroverted and, in fact was supported by Dr. Hart's 
report. 
Mr. Blauer in fact was never disabled from any part of his regular, historic duties. 
He could even conduct the occasional hearing as he had done without complaint until he 
reached the number of eight hearings a week. He simply could not perform the increasing 
and finally extreme number of hearings that Tani Downing attempted to force him to do 
when she knew it was causing him pain and injury. 
Dr. Hart's report states that the Grievant could continue to perform his regular 
(historic) duties in the same manner and at the same (successful) level that he had 
performed them for the previous 23 years (see report, Agency Exhibit 2, R. 895, page 13 
"response to question #2" - "yes, the condition does cause a total inability to perform his 
normal work as assigned in midyear 2003 [that is the assignment to conduct hearings full 
time]... [however] he could perform the functions and tasks associated with modified 
accommodations at the level of adequacy which he had performed in the past"). 
Even though Hart's report wholly supported Mr. Blauer's position, though, DWS 
attempted to use it to support their claim that he could not perform his duties with or 
without accommodation, and therefore justify their dismissal. This is a most telling point. 
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It demonstrates that the Department is willing to twist and shift the facts and evidence in 
order to justify their predisposition to get rid of a competent successful 23 year veteran 
for untried reasons in violation of R477-7-17(3) (b), Utah Admin. Code. 
B. Mr. Blauer was shown to be capable of performing the "essential 
functions" of his prior position with or without reasonable 
accommodation. 
Mr. Blauer testified, without contradiction, that he could perform the "essential 
functions" of his historic position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as defined both by 
the Position Description Questionnaire related to that position, and by long-standing 
practice. R894 at 240:14-18. The holding of administrative hearings was never a 
described function of Mr. Blauer's position under the Position Description Questionnaire; 
however, he had held some hearings thereunder during his time in the position. R894 at 
235:15-25; R895, Grievance Exhibit 16. Only when he was "reassigned" to do nothing 
but conduct administrative law hearings to the extent assigned did Mr. Blauer's 
disabilities impede his capacity to perform in his job — and this for physiological, as well 
as psychological, reasons. R894 at 252:13-23. When Mr. Blauer conveyed information 
concerning this difficulty to his supervisor, Tani Downing (and supported it with 
information from his physician), he was assigned to do more hearings. R894 at 253:1 
through 255:10. When this insistence forced him to apply for and receive long-term 
disability, Mr. Blauer remained willing to return to work with a mix of duties which 
would accommodate his disability. R895, Grievance Exhibit 7. Tani Downing, though, 
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saw such conditions as Mr. Blauer's attempt to dictate the terms of his employment -
something for which she would not stand (R893 at 114:24 through 115:6). CSRB upheld 
the Hearing Officer's finding that DWS had not abused its discretion in this regard, 
noting only that the holding of unemployment hearings "had always been a 'core function 
of a Legal/Enforcement Counsel II position'" R873. 
Regulations enacted to implement the Americans With Disabilities Act (the 
standards of which are incorporated by reference into R477-7-17(3)(b)) call for a far more 
thoughtful probe of "essential functions" than that offered by the hearing officer or 
CSRB: 
(1) The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the 
employment position the individual with the disability holds or desires. The 
term "essential functions" does not include the marginal functions of the 
position. 
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, 
including but not limited to the following: 
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the 
position exists is to perform that function; 
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited 
number of employees available among whom the performance 
of that job function can be distributed; and/or 
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the 
incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or 
ability to perform the particular function. 
(3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not 
limited to: 
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(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are 
essential; 
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job; 
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the 
function; 
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to 
perform the function; 
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; 
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; 
and/or 
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar 
jobs. 
29C.F.R.Partl630.2(n). 
As noted above, Mr. Blauer equipped DWS with sufficient information and 
medical documentation to permit "a reassignment to one or more immediately available 
vacant positions, for which the employee qualifies, and whose essential functions the 
employee is able to perform without a reasonable accommodation" (R477-7-17(3)(b), 
Utah Admin. Code) under the foregoing standard. Mr. Blauer himself (as well as his 
legal and administrative representatives) made abundantly clear to DWS that he could do 
what he had always done as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III without any reasonable 
accommodation. CSRB and its hearing officer, however, joined with DWS in the 
unexplained decision that 23 years of history did not establish the "essential functions" of 
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Mr. Blauer's position of Legal/ Enforcement Counsel III; that, rather, the "essential 
functions" for that position (where he alone was concerned, apparently) had suddenly 
metamorphosed into the conducting of administrative law hearings full-time. This, 
according to the DWS (and CSRB) could be turned into the sole "essential function" of 
Mr. Blauer's position as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III by administrative fiat alone. It is 
submitted that what does and does not constitute an "essential function", as opposed to a 
"marginal function", under the governing regulatory standard is simply not met by this 
determination. While the employer's judgment as to which functions are "essential" and 
which are not is evidence under the Regulation, so also are written job descriptions 
(which, in this case, no where mentioned the conducting of administrative hearings); the 
amount of time spent on performing the function (historically, less than 10 percent of Mr. 
Blauer's duties); the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function 
(nowhere addressed in DWS' case in chief); the work experience of past incumbents in 
the job (similar if not identical to Mr. Blauer's historic experience - R894 at 244:6 
through 250:23); and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs (DWS 
failed to identify a single individual holding the position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel 
III assigned to do nothing but administrative law hearings). 
In short, there exists no substantial evidence in the record to establish DWS' 
compliance with the requirements of R477-7-17(3)(b), Utah Admin. Code. 
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C. DWS presented no evidence that it had attempted to place Mr. 
Blauer in an immediately-vacant position the essential functions 
of which he could perform without reasonable accommodation. 
R477-7-17(3)(b) called upon DWS to take affirmative action if it did not want to 
accept Mr. Blauer's suggestion concerning reinstatement in his prior duties. Upon 
expiration of the year leave period, and with awareness of Mr. Blauer5 s disability, DWS 
needed to "offer the employee a reassignment to one or more immediately available 
vacant positions, for which the employee qualifies, and whose essential functions the 
employee is able to perform without a reasonable accommodation". DWS offered not one 
shred of evidence that it had even attempted to locate, much less offer to Mr. Blauer, such 
an alternate position. It did, in fact, precisely the opposite, demanding that Mr. Blauer 
accept assignment to the precise set of duties which, to their own express knowledge, he 
could not perform due to disability, for no articulated reason other than the rules were 
theirs - not his - to make. On this basis alone, CSRB's ruling must be reversed. 
D. DWS was not excused from compliance with R477-7-17(3)(B) by Mr. 
Blauer's failure to provide medical documentation of his ability to 
perform the essential functions of the position he had historically held. 
As noted above, the record proves that Mr. Blauer was always able to perform the 
essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
of record that he was ever informed, until long after his employment was terminated, that 
he was deficient by not presenting a medical release in order to return to work. It is 
reasonable for him to believe it was not necessary for him to provide such a release to 
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perform the essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as established by 
longstanding practice, that he had never been medically disabled from. It was also 
reasonable for him to believe that the Department would have been satisfied in that regard 
by the letter written by Vince Rampton (R. 895, Grievant's Exhibit 24) and previous 
letters from his medical provider already in record especially since there is no particular 
required format for such a release. Therefore there did not appear to be a need for him to 
present a more formal medical release in order to return to work to perform those 
functions he had never been disqualified from. 
Mr. Blauer was simply never told otherwise - not in the hearing before the 
department representative representing Director Ireland, nor in Director Ireland's letter of 
dismissal. It is important to note that neither in the letter of termination nor in the 
testimony offered by the hiring authority, Raylene Ireland, was the matter of the alleged 
failure to produce such a release ever made an issue or indicated as cause in Mr. Blauer's 
termination. It was never brought up, in fact, until the hearing before CSRB Hearing 
Officer Wallentine! It can only be assumed that it wasn't a factor in the dismissal and was 
a moot point before the CSRB. 
If it had been important to the Department for Mr. Blauer to produce something 
more in the way of a medical release, the Department should have notified him of the 
deficiency in time for him to produce such. To make a belated claim that the failure to 
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produce such a release had any part of the decision is entirely pretext. It is clear that such 
an alleged deficiency was not a proximate cause of the termination. 
In the worst case scenario, assuming arguendo that Mr. Blauer's alleged failure to 
present a medical release to return to work could be considered a terminable offense, it 
would be incumbent upon the agency to advise Blauer, a 23-year employee of the agency, 
that he needed to present such medical release and give him an opportunity to provide 
such (or otherwise respond to the issue). If he refused to do so, then the agency may have 
an argument for disciplining him, but he has a right to be noticed of any work-related 
deficiency before discipline could be imposed. 
In short, Mr. Blauer's failure to produce an un-demanded medical release as the 
price of rehiring cannot be urged as "substantial evidence" of DWS' compliance with 
regulatory standards incumbent on it prior to terminating his employment. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS NOT 
UNTIMELY. 
In its Order of July 27, 2006, CSRB refused to consider Mr. Blauer's Request for 
Reconsideration of its June 28 decision upholding the Hearing Officer's ruling herein, 
stating only that its filing was untimely, and that it lacked jurisdiction on that basis. DWS 
has taken the position that, by reason thereof, this appeal was likewise untimely. Both 
positions were presented on Motion for Summary Disposition herein, and both were 
rejected pending briefing. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, a party is entitled to petition an "agency" to 
reconsider its ruling. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3), filing and disposition of 
such a request tolls the period for seeking judicial review. 
A. The filing of a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal period. 
DWS argued in its motion that Petitioner first petitioned this Court 34 days after 
CSRB issued its June 28, 2006 ruling, and that the Petition is therefore time-barred under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a). DWS acknowledged, however, that during that 
interim, Petitioner filed a request for reconsideration with CSRB. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 permits any party to an administrative proceeding to 
request reconsideration of any "order [that] would otherwise constitute final agency 
action" within 20 days of issuance of such order. If a request for reconsideration is 
submitted, the head of the agency issuing the order is required to issue a written order 
granting the request or denying the request. If no order issues within 20 days of the 
request being filed, it is deemed denied by operation of law. 
This Court has expressly held that an appeal filed within 30 days after an agency's 
disposition of a request for reconsideration is timely, even if filed more than 30 days after 
the final agency decision as to which the request was made. In Orton v. Utah State Tax 
Collection Division, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1993), therein, this Court (relying on the 
decision of 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 
1993), held that "A party may file a petition for judicial review within 30 days after the 
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order constituting the final agency action . . . 'or' within 30 days after the "deemed 
denied' date established by § 63-46b-13(3)(b)." 864 P.2d at 907 (emphasis in original). 
In this case, Lorin Blauer has petitioned this Court to review CSRB's June 28, 
2006 decision, which it declined to reconsider on July 27,2006 - less than 30 days before 
this petition was filed. As such, this petition is not untimely by reason of having been 
filed 34 days after issuance of the June 27 decision. 
B. DWS may not bootstrap CSRB's decision to decline jurisdiction over 
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration into a jurisdictional issue for 
this Court. 
DWS attempted to circumvent the foregoing by saying that, since the CSRB held 
that Petitioner's request for reconsideration was untimely, this Court somehow lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a petition for review of that decision. DWS' argument in this regard, 
though, confuses the jurisdiction of CSRB with the jurisdiction of this Court. 
Petitioner herein challenges CSRB's ruling that his request for reconsideration was 
untimely. As noted above, that challenge was timely filed before this Court. Whether 
CSRB properly or improperly limited its own jurisdiction in this regard is one of the 
issues to be reviewed by this Court incident to the petition. It does not, however, go to 
the jurisdiction of this Court. The Utah Legislature has conferred jurisdiction upon this 
Court to hear appeals from all "final agency actions" wherever a petition is filed within 
30 days of the "final agency action", or within 30 days following disposition of a request 
to review a "final agency action". Petitioner has met the time limits specified by statute, 
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and is properly before this Court. Whether CSRB was correct in holding the request for 
reconsideration untimely is a substantive issue to be reviewed by this Court - not a 
threshold jurisdictional issue limiting this Court's ability to address the Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Lorin Blauer was forced to go on long-term disability leave when his supervisors 
at DWS insisted on reassigning him to job responsibilities which known disabilities 
precluded him from performing. When the resulting leave ended, he was entitled to 
ADA-defined accommodation, either by simple reinstatement to his longstanding job 
duties (as he had suggested), or to another vacant position the essential functions of which 
his disabilities did not prevent him from performing. Instead, DWS laid down an 
arbitrary demand: come back and do precisely the work that gave rise to your disability, 
01 be fired. DWS thus failed to follow regulations incumbent on it, and CSRB failed to 
reverse its decision despite the mandate of then-governing law. 
Based on the foregoing, the decision of CSRB should be reversed, and Lorin 
Blauer ordered reinstated with back pay. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2007. / 
JONES WALDO HO^BROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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the Utah Department of Workforce Services (Department and DWS) and presented oral argument 
on the Department's behalf. Wendy Peterson and Geoffrey T. Landward were present with Mr. Lott 
as the Department Representatives. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408 
of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act at §§67-19-1 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in 
the Utah Admin. Code at R137-1-1 through -23. This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the 
final administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for 
Mr. Blauer's appeal from termination of his employment. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and 
these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to 
R137-l-18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) 
pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. 
(§§63-46b-0.5e/5^.) 
<^ tfv n O VL C 
Y « J 0 3 Z.U:: 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
L PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT 
Review of the Step 5 evidentiary record and the appeal briefs filed by the parties establishes 
that on October 8,2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave from work for medical reasons. 
(Tr.l at 10; Ex. A-5; Hearing Officer's findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order 
(Step 5 Decision) f 4 at 2; Grievant's Appeal Brief to CSRB (Appellant's Brief on Appeal) at 9; 
Respondent Agency's Step 6 Appellate Brief (Department's Brief on Appeal) at 5) Thereafter, on 
January 26, 2004, Appellant applied for Long Term Disability (LTD) Benefits with the Utah 
Retirement Systems.1 (Ex. A-l; Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9; Department's Brief on Appeal 
at 5) 
As part of the LTD application process, Appellant underwent an independent psychological 
evaluation. (Ex. A-2; Step 5 Decision f 6 at 3; Appellant Brief on Appeal at 10; Department Brief 
on Appeal at 6) This independent psychological evaluation was performed on June 14, 2004, by 
Darrell M. Hart, Ph.D. (Dr. Hart). (Id) Dr. Hart's evaluation conclusions were forwarded to 
Ms. Jeri Richards, LTD Specialist, Long Term Disability Program, Public Employees' Health 
Program (PEHP).2 (Ex. A-2) In his evaluation conclusions, Dr. Hart specifically represents that 
Appellant suffered from psychopathology and that this psychopathology in fact rendered Appellant 
totally unable "to perform his normal work as assigned in midyear 2003." (Id) 
On July 14,2004, PEHP notified Appellant and the Department that Appellant had been 
approved for LTD benefits based upon "psychological illness." (Exs. A-3, A-4; Step 5 Decision ^  6 
at 3; Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9; Department Brief on Appeal at 6) In granting its approval 
of Appellant's request for LTD benefits, PEHP specifically informed Appellant that "your long term 
disability benefits were approved for a maximum of two years, based on psychological illness. Our 
!Though there was no testimony or documentary evidence regarding the Utah Retirement Systems, 
it is evident from the evidentiary record that the Utah Retirement Systems administers and oversees 
Long Term Disability Benefits for State employees. This fact, however, is of little relevance in that 
neither party disputes that Appellant applied for LTD benefits to cover his leave which began on 
October 8,2003. 
2Iike the Utah Retirement Systems, there is no testimony or documentary evidence regarding 
PEHP. However, it is evident from the evidentiary record that PEHP administers LTD benefits for 
the Utah Retirement Systems and that Ms. Richards is a LTD Specialist with PEHP. Again, these 
facts are of little relevance in this dispute and are added for clarity only. 
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program allows benefits to a disabled worker for a maximum of two years if psychopathology 
primarily causes the disability." (Ex. A-4; Step 5 Decision % 8 at 3) 
On October 1,2004, the Department notified Appellant that the one-year period of allowable 
medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was coming to a conclusion.3 (Tr. I at 24-26; 
Ex. A-5; Step 5 Decision 110 at 3) In this October 1,2004 notification, the Department reminded 
Appellant of his right to contact Department personnel and arrange to return to work at the 
conclusion of his LTD leave. This notification also informed AppeUant of his need to provide a 
medical release before his employment could be restored and that if he failed to return to work at 
the end of the one-year period, his employment would be terminated. (Id.) 
On October 4, 2004, Vincent C. Rampton, Attorney at Law, responded on behalf of 
Appellant to the Department's October 1, 2004 letter. (Ex. G-24)4 Appellant's October 4, 2004 
response letter unambiguously asserted that Appellant's medical condition had not changed and that 
he remained disabled but also asserted that Appellant remained "able to perform the essential 
functions of... the position he occupied prior to demotion." (Id)5 
As of October 8, 2004, AppeUant had not returned to work. Based upon these facts, the 
3DHRM rule R477 specifically provides that "medical leave begins on the last day the employee 
worked." (UtahAdmin. Code R477-7-17(l)(a)) There is no factual dispute that AppeUant's last day 
of work was October 8,2003. 
4Throughout the proceedings before the CSRB relating to AppeUant's dismissal, he has been 
represented by Tom Cantrell, an advocate. However, Vincent C. Rampton filed with the CSRB the 
appeal of AppeUant's dismissal from employment with the Department and continues to represent 
Appellant in matters coUateral to these proceedings. 
5The issue of demotion is one of the coUateral proceedings AppeUant is pursuing. In a grievance 
originally filed with the CSRB on October 15,2003, Appellant argued that in September 2003 when 
the Department began requiring Appellant to conduct unemployment hearings fuU time with no 
change in job title or pay rate, he was in fact demoted. In an Administrative Review of the File 
dated November 12,2003, the CSRB dismissed AppeUant's grievance finding it had no jurisdiction 
to adjudicate his claims because there was no demotion. On November 30,2004, in a review of the 
CSRB's administrative ruling, the Third District Court ruled that the Department "did not demote 
the [Grievant]" when it assigned him to perform duties of an administrative law judge and that "the 
CSRB was correct in reaching the same conclusion." Blauer v. Department ofWorkforce Services 
CivUNo. 040900221. Appellantthen appealed the Third District Court's decision to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that "DWS did not 
demote Blauer, and thus, the CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Matter's grievance. 
Blauer v. Department ofWorkforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204 (Utah Ct App. 2005) 
Department again notified Appellant in a letter dated October 8,2004, that his position of Legal 
Enforcement Counsel m continued to be open and available for him to return to. In addition, this 
letter further informed Appellant of his right to have a hearing prior to any termination of his 
employment for failure to return to work. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6; Step 5 Decision ^ 12 at 3-4; 
Department Brief on Appeal at 8-9) Appellant never returned to work. 
On October 27,2004, a hearing on Appellant's failure to return to work was held before 
Department Representative Scott Steele (Mr. Steele), who was designated by then Executive 
Director Raylene Ireland (Exec. Dir. Ireland)6 to conduct Appellant's predismissal hearing. 
(Ex. A-7)7 Following this hearing, Mr. Steele reported his recommendations to Exec. Dir. Ireland. 
After meeting with Mr. Steele, Exec. Dir. Ireland determined that the "department really had 
no other position it could take except to move forward with termination." (Tr. I at 122) Exec. Dir. 
Ireland then issued her letter terminating Appellant's employment. (Ex. A-7) The effective date of 
Appellant's dismissal was November 3,2004. (Id) 
In Exec. Dir. Ireland's written decision, she specifically indicated that Appellant's 
termination from employment was based on the fact that he was unable or unwilling to return to 
work after being on LTD for one year as required by DHRM rule.8 Specifically addressing 
Appellant's failure to return to work, Exec. Dir. Ireland stated: 
On October 1,2004, you were sent a letter regarding your return to 
work. You indicated during the hearing that you are unable to return 
to your previous work assignment. You were offered a position at 
the Department of Workforce Services with the same title and pay 
range. However, you have declined to accept the duties that have 
been assigned to this position. 
Based upon these factors, Exec. Dir. Ireland concluded that "I have no choice but to terminate your 
employment. This decision is based upon your medical leave of longer than one year, and the fact 
6At the time of Appellant's dismissal, Raylene Ireland was the Executive Director of the 
Department Since that time, Tani Pack-Downing has been appointed as Executive Director of the 
Department The Board notes that on October 8,2003, when Appellant first went on LTD leave, 
Executive Director Downing was in fact Appellant's supervisor. 
7
 Utah Cade Ann § 67-19-18 allows predismissal hearings to be held by the "department head or 
designated representative " (emphasis added) 
8DHRM personnel rules are found at Utah Admin. Code R477 et seq. 
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that we offered you a job, which you declined." (Id.) 
Thereafter, on November 16,2004, Appellant timely filed an appeal of his dismissal from 
employment with the CSRB. As set forth above, this appeal was filed by Mr. Rampton who 
specifically indicated that "while I [Mr. Rampton] will be advising Mr. Blauer in connection with 
this appeal, he will be represented before the Career Service Review Board by Mr. Tom Cantrell." 
n . PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSRB 
On August 17-18,2005, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before CSRB 
Hearing OflBcer Kenneth R. Wallentine. At this hearing, Appellant was represented by advocate 
Tom Cantrell. The Department was represented by Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip S. Lott 
Assisting Mr. Lott as the Management Representative was JoAnne Campbell (Ms. Campbell), 
Human Resources Director, DWS. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellant was dismissed from his employment, the 
Department has the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving its case by substantial 
evidence. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a) and (c)) 
The specific issues adjudicated at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing were twofold. First, did the 
Department terminate Appellant's employment to advance the good of the public service or for just 
cause as required by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18? Second, if substantial evidence does not support 
the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment, what is the appropriate remedy? 
(Prehearing Conference Summary and Order % 3 at 2; Step 5 Decision at 2) 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Hearing Officer received evidence relating to 
the specific reasons supporting the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment. 
This evidence included testimony given and documents received concerning the factual basis 
supporting the Department's decision and whether its actions were in compliance with State statutes 
and personnel rules. 
Specifically, testimony was given and documentary evidence received establishing that in 
October 2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave for medical reasons. (Tr. I at 10; Ex. A-5) 
In addition, evidence was received concerning Appellant's authorized request for, and the eventual 
approval by PEHP of, LTD benefits. (Exs. A-l, A-3, A-4) There was also evidence received 
concerning the Department's notification to Appellant of State personnel rules that limited 
Appellant's right to return to work to one year from his last day worked. (Ex. A-5) Evidence was 
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also received showing the Department's efforts notifying Appellant of the conditions he must meet 
in order for him to be reinstated by the Department (Tr. I at 24-26, 52; Exs. A-5, A-6) 
The evidentiary hearing also included extensive evidence concerning the Department's 
actions after determining that Appellant was unable or unwilling to return to the Department as 
Legal Counsel m performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of 
absence. (Tr. I at 29-30, 61-62; Tr. II at 293; Exs. A-6. G-24).9 This evidence included specific 
efforts by the Department to ensure Appellant that his position would be open and available to him 
and that prior to any final determinations being made as to his employment with the Department, 
he would have an opportunity to meet with the Executive Director's designee in a predismissal 
hearing. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6) Finally, extensive evidence was received regarding Appellant's 
concerns that the Department's actions of terminating his employmentviolated State personnel rules 
and statutes regarding LTD leave and dismissals. (Exs. G-9, G-30-16; Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
at 20-21; Amended Prehearing/Scheduling Conference Summary and Order at 2) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 Decision 
dated September 19, 2005. In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer examined the evidence 
presented at the hearing and found that the Department had met its burden to show that Appellant 
failed to return to work as required by State personnel rules. The Hearing Officer also concluded 
that the Department had complied with all relevant statutory and administrative requirements in 
reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment. (Step 5 Decision Yl 6 and 10 at 6) 
Based upon these findings, the Hearing Officer concluded that the Department's termination 
of Appellant's employment was not excessive, disproportionate nor did it constitute an abuse of 
discretion. (Step 5 Decision K 11) The Hearing Officer further concluded that the Department's 
termination of Appellant's employment was for the good of the public service and otherwise for just 
cause based on Appellant's failure to return to work following expiration of the maximum period 
of disability leave. (Id) 
9As set forth above, in September 2003, the Department began requiring Appellant to conduct 
unemployment hearings full time. Prior to September 2003, conducting unemployment hearings was 
a minor component of Appellant's daily work duties, but as held by the Utah Court of appeals, 
holding unemployment hearings has always been a "core job function" of the Legal Enforcement 
Counsel III position. (Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204,1211 (Utah Ct 
App. 2005) 
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83 
, Decision and Final Agency Action 0W861 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In his appeal before this Board, Appellant challenges numerous aspects of the Hearing 
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellant contests many of the Hearing Officer's factual 
findings, asserting that these findings were not based on substantial evidence and that the Hearing 
Officer failed to "address the case as it was brought before him." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 22) 
Addressing the Hearing Officer's findings in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, Appellant states: "His 
findings of fact appear to be rational and accurate, but most are skewed a little off point with the 
cumulative effect of misstating the case." (Id.) Indeed, Appellant concludes that the Hearing 
Officer's findings are skewed sufficiently that "it doesn't even seem to be the same case." (Id.) 
Appellant also argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department had 
complied with all relevant statutory and administrative requirements in reaching its decision to 
terminate Appellant's employment. Specifically addressing this issue, Appellant argues that the 
Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department offered Appellant the opportunity to return 
to the same position he held prior to going on LTD. (Step 5 Decision f 7 at 6) In support of his 
position, Appellant argues that because the Department expected Appellant to perform 
unemployment hearings full time upon his return, he was in fact not being returned to the position 
he "previously held." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 20-22) Based upon these factors, Appellant 
asserts that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department complied with DHRM rule 
R477-7-17(3)(a). (Id.) 
In essence, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's findings that substantial evidence 
supported the essential facts relied upon by the Department in reaching its decision to terminate 
Appellant's employment. He further argues that the Hearing Officer erred by legally concluding that 
in reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment, the Department correctly applied all 
pertinent statutes, rules and policies as mandated by UtahAdmin. CWeR137-l-21(3)(a)(ii). Indeed, 
the substance of Appellant's argument before this Board appears to be that the Department did not 
offer to place Appellant in his "previously held position" of Legal Counsel HI, but rather offered to 
place him in the different or lesser position of "Administrative Law Judge" thereby requiring him 
to perform functions for which he was disabled from performing. Based upon these factors, 
Appellant argues the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department complied with State 
rules and statutes in reaching its decision to terminate his employment. 
•
 v
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n. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) through 
(c), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational 
according to the substantial evidence standard. When the board 
determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are 
not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as 
a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual 
findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of 
the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected 
the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a 
whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing 
officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes 
in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed 
by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate 
factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and 
statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to die Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the 
Department's disciplinary penalty of termination of Mr. Blauer's employment is reasonable and 
rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with die correct application of 
relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer. 
1 t i i ; . ( 'i 
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BOARD'S REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. FACTUAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE DEPARTMENT'S 
TERMINATION OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT 
AS stated above, the Board's first obligation on review is to make a determination of whether 
the factual findings of the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. (Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(4)(a)) In the instant case, the Hearing Officer 
received testimony from numerous witnesses, including Appellant himself, regarding Appellant's 
failure to return from LTD leave within one year as required by DHRM rule R477-7-17. Exhibits 
were also introduced by the parties establishing a sequence of events occurring up to the time 
Appellant's employment with the Department was terminated. This documentary evidence included, 
but was not limited to, his application and eventual approval for LTD benefits; the Department's 
letter outlining requirements for Appellant to return to work, and; the Department's actions after 
determining that Appellant was unable or unwilling to return to the Department as a Legal 
Counsel HI performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of absence. 
(Exs. A-l, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, G-24) 
After carefully considering the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and reviewing the 
documents received into evidence, the Hearing Officer issued his decision. This decision set forth 
several dispositive facts crucial to his final decision. Among other facts, the Hearing Office 
specifically found that the last day Appellant worked for the Department was October 8,2003, when 
Appellant began taking authorized leave from work for medical reasons. (Step 5 Decision f 4at 2) 
He also found that Appellant was approved for LTD benefits based on psychopathological illness. 
(Id. t | 6-7at 3) The Hearing Officer further found that on October 1,2004, the Department notified 
Appellant that the one-year period of allowable medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was 
coming to a conclusion and that Appellant's position of Legal Counsel HI continued to be open and 
available for him to return. (Id. Kf 10,14-16,22 at 3-5) In addition, the Hearing Officer also found 
that Appellant never provided the Department with any notice or indication that he was no longer 
fully disabled due to his psychopathological illness. (Id. f 19 at 4) Finally, the Hearing Officer found 
that Appellant failed to return to work within one year as required by DHRM rule. (Id. % 24 at 5) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the sworn testimony 
of the witnesses and the documents admitted into evidence, this Board finds the Hearing Officer's 
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factual findings as set forth in his Step 5 Decision both reasonable and rational and supported by 
substantial evidence.10 In reaching this decision, the Board stresses that it has consistently held that 
the findings made by a fact finder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. {Chournos v. Utah 
Dep't of Workforce Services, 8 CSRB 74 (Step 6 2004), Jones v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 4 
CSRB 38 (Step 6 1992); Seeateo Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at 7-8 (1986))11 In 
granting such deference to the hearing officer's factual findings, the Board notes that it is the hearing 
officer who is in the best and most unique position to hear the testimony, weigh the evidence and 
judge the veracity of the witnesses' various statements. 
During the evidentiary hearing held in this matter, substantial and persuasive testimony and 
documentary evidence was provided supporting the Hearing Officer's factual findings. Specifically, 
the evidence establishes that on October 8, 2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave from 
work for medical reasons. (Tr. I at 2; Ex. A-5) The evidence further establishes that on January 26, 
2004, Appellant applied for LTD benefits with the Utah Retirement Systems. (Ex. A-1) As part of 
the LTD application process, Appellant underwent an independent psychological evaluation. 
(Ex. A-2) This independent psychological evaluation was performed on June 14,2004, by Dr. Hart 
(Id.) 
Dr. Hart's evaluation findings were forwarded to PEHP for determination of Appellant's 
eligibility for LTD benefits. (Ex. A-2) In his evaluation conclusions, Dr. Hart specifically provides: 
My task is to determine if Mr. Blauer suffers from psychopathology. 
* * * 
1. Is the examinee suffering from psychopathology? 
10CSRB rule R137-1-2 defines substantial evidence to be "evidence possessing something of 
substance and relevant consequence, and which furnishes substantial basis of fact from which issues 
tendered can be reasonably resolved. It is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion, but is less than a preponderance." Addressing substantial evidence courts 
have found that substantial evidence "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v State, 
903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995), quoting First Nt'l Bank v. County Bd of Equalization, 799 P.2d 
1163,1165 (Utah 1990); see also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,68 (Utah Ct App. 
1989) Substantial evidence "is more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence and something less than the 
weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm *n, 842 P.2d 910,911 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) 
"The PRB was the Personal Review Board, the predecessor for the Career Service Review Board. 
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Response: Mr. Blauer is indeed suffering from 
psychopathology. 
* * * 
2. If yes, does the condition cause a total inability to perform his 
normal work? 
Response: Yes. The condition does cause a total inability to 
perform his normal work as assigned in mid year 2003. 
(Ex. A-2 at 1 and 13) 
This evaluation further provided that: 
Psychologically, this man does not want to return to the workplace, 
irrespective of whatever accommodations might be made for him 
And, if he is forced to do so his anxiety and depression will be 
debilitating. He won't function well because of those psychological 
conditions. And, he doesn't want to be there. Unfortunately, there 
are two victims here. The system is victimized by a man who is 
unwilling and psychologically limited to accommodate to job 
performance expectations in a changing workplace. Mr. Blauer is a 
victim because of unwanted physical challenges and 
psychophysiological vulnerabilities . . . insufficient psychological 
resilience to work within the changing work setting as well as to fight 
off a tendency to allow his psychology to cause or exacerbate the 
physical problems. 
(Id. at 12) 
In addition, the record further establishes that on July 14,2004, PEHP notified Appellant and 
the Department that Appellant had been approved for LTD benefits based upon "psychological 
illness." (Exs. A-3, A-4) In granting its approval of Appellant's request for LTD benefits, PEHP 
informed Appellant that "your [Appellant's] long term benefits were approved for a maximum of 
two years, based on psychological illness. Our program allows benefits to disabled workers for a 
maximum of two years if psychopathology primarily causes the disability." (Ex. A-4) (emphasis 
added) 
By letter dated October 1,2004, the Department notified Appellant that the one-year period 
of allowable medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was coming to a conclusion. (Tr. I at 
24-26; Ex. A-5) This October 1,2004 notification letter specifically provided that: 
Last year, you were placed on leave for a medical reason, and 
subsequently were found eligible for the Long Term Disability 
Program (LTD). The Department of Human Resource Management 
rule R477-7-17(l) states that employees shall be granted up to one 
year of medical leave under those conditions. Our records show that 
r» ; t\ r « P D D Ol 
your last day worked was October 8,2004. 
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to work, 
please contact Wendy Peterson . . . so that we can arrange for your 
return. If you are still unable to return to work, your employment 
with the Department will be terminated. Termination of your 
employment under these circumstances does not affect your 
eligibility for rehire. 
* * * 
You have until October 5, 2004 to contact Wendy and arrange for 
your return to work, or submit written documentation as to why your 
employment with the department should not be terminated at this 
time. If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a 
medical release. 
(Ex. A-5) 
Regarding the Department's requirement that Appellant provide a medical release, 
Ms. Campbell testified as follows: 
A. When people are on long-term disability there's a 
requirement that we keep them on abeyance on our payroll 
one year from the time they left the department for a medical 
reason. Once that year is up it's routine for us to send them a 
letter that says, "Are you able to come back to work?" If they 
are able to come back to work with a release they are placed 
back in the department. If they are not then we do take them 
off of the state payroll system. 
* * * 
Q. When a letter such as Exhibit 5 is sent to an employee that's 
been on medical leave does the employee have any obligation 
to do anything? 
A. They do. They have the obligation to contact whichever HR 
specialist is listed in the letter to arrange for their return... 
A. The letter also indicates that -that there's a - a request for a 
medical release? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And what's the purpose of that? 
A. Well, to determine if, in fact, they are now no longer disabled 
and able to return to work. 
Q. . . . Would Workforce Services uniformly require a medical 
release for - for work after one year of medical leave? 
A. That would be the practice, yes. 
(Tr. I at 24-26,52) 
Substantial evidence also supports the Hearing Officer's finding that on October 4, 2004, 
Appellant, through Mr. Rampton, responded to the Department's October 1, 2004 letter by 
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indicating that his medical condition had not changed and that Appellant remained disabled from 
performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of absence. 
(Ex. G-24)12 Regarding his ability to return to work in October 2004, Appellant himself testified at 
the evidentiary hearing in this matter as follows: 
Q. You admit that you provided no information from any health 
care providers to Mr. Steele verifying that you recovered 
from your psychological illness that was the basis for your 
long-term disabilities? 
A. Provided no psychological information, no. 
* * * 
Q. You admit that you provided no written documentation from 
any health care provider stating that you have recovered from 
the basis of your long-term disability which was 
psychological illness? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. Hat293-294) 
Indeed, the evidentiary record establishes that at the time the evidentiary hearing was held 
in this matter, more than two years after going on medical leave, Appellant was still receiving LTD 
benefits and had not yet received a written release to return to work based upon recovery from 
psychological illness. Specifically addressing this issue in the hearing, Appellant testified as follows: 
Q. Are you still receiving long-term disability benefits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have not notified the provider of long-term disability 
benefits that you were no longer disabled? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Q. Have you received a written release to return to work based 
upon recovery of psychological illness? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you received any other type of release from a health 
care provider based upon recovery of psychological illness? 
12Importantly, the Board notes that this letter also states that Appellant remained "able to perform 
the essential functions of... the position he occupied prior to demotion." The apparent contradiction 
highlighted in this letter constitutes the issue that lies at the core of this appeal. In essence, Appellant 
argues that the Department never really offered to place him in his "previously held position" 
because holding unemployment hearings is not an essential function of the Legal Enforcement 
Counsel HI position, but a function assigned to the Administrative Law Judge position. The Board 
is not persuaded by Appellant's arguments on this issue for the reasons set forth at pages 16-19 
below. 
A. No. 
(Tr. Eat294-298) 
Moreover, both Ms. Campbell and Mr. Steele testified that at no time prior to his dismissal 
did Appellant ever provide notification that the condition upon which Appellant's LTD was based 
had been resolved. When Mr. Steele was questioned about the predismissal hearing he conducted, 
Mr. Steele testified as follows: 
Q. Who appeared at the hearing? 
A. Lorin was there and Mr. Cantrell was with him, myself and 
Wendy Peterson, who was our HR representative for the 
hearing. 
Q. Were you the person who conducted the hearing? 
A. I did. 
* * * 
Q. Was Mr. Blauer given the opportunity to present information 
at the hearing? 
A. He was. 
* * * 
Q* Was any information presented to you regarding Mr. Blauer's 
psychological condition? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Q. Were there any - any medical records presented at the 
hearing? 
A. Not that I recall, no. 
Q. Were there any releases from any health care providers 
indicating that Mr. Blauer was able to return to work? 
A. No. 
(Tr. I at 60-62) 
Similarly, Ms. Campbell testified that Appellant never provided a medical release indicating 
he is able to return to work. Specifically addressing this issue, Ms. Campbell testified: 
Q. Are you aware of Mr. Blauer ever providing the agency with 
a release from a health care provider indicating that he was 
able to return to work? 
A» . . . No. 
(Tr. I at 28-29) 
In the instant case, substantial evidence also supports the Hearing Officer's findings that by 
October 8, 2004, Appellant had not returned to work. Based upon this fact, and Appellant's 
October 4,2004 letter, the Department again notified Appellant in a letter dated October 8,2004, 
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that his position of Legal Enforcement Counsel EI continued to be open and available for him to 
return to. However, because of the language set forth in Appellant's October 4,2004 letter and his 
failure to report to work on October 8,2004, this letter also informed Appellant of his right to have 
a hearing prior to any termination of his employment for failure to return to work as required by 
DHRM rule. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6) After receiving this correspondence, Appellant did not return to 
work. 
Finally, the evidentiary record further establishes that on October 27, 2004, a hearing on 
Appellant's failure to return to work within one year was held before Department Representative 
Mr. Steele. (Ex. A-7) Mr. Steele was designated by Exec. Dir. Ireland to conduct Appellant's 
predismissal hearing. (Ex. A-6) As set forth above, the record establishes that at this hearing, 
Appellant did not provide a medical release or any other information that he had recovered from the 
medical condition upon which his LTD leave had been granted. (Tr. I at 60-62; Tr. II at 93-94) 
Based upon these and other representations made to him at this hearing, Mr. Steele recommended 
to Exec. Dir. Ireland that Appellant's employment with the Department be terminated for failure to 
return to work within one year as required by DHRM rule. (Tr. I at 122) 
By letter dated November 3,2004, Exec. Dir. Ireland informed Appellant of her decision to 
terminate Appellant's employment. Exec. Dir. Ireland's decision was based upon Appellant's 
representations made to Mr. Steele that he was "unable to return to your [Appellant's] previous work 
assignment." (Ex. A-7) Specifically, Exec. Dir. Ireland stated: 
On October 1,2004, you were sent a letter regarding your return to 
work. You indicated during the hearing that you are unable to return 
to your previous work assignment. You were offered a position at 
the Department of Workforce Services with the same title and pay 
range. However, you have declined to accept the duties that have 
been assigned to this position. 
* * * 
I have no choice but to terminate your employment. This decision is 
based upon your medical leave of longer than one year, and the fact 
that we offered you a job, which you declined. 
(Id.) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board finds that there is more than 
substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's factual findings in this case. The record 
establishes that in October 2003, Appellant became disabled from performing his 
Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position with the Department due to psychological illness. The 
record further supports the Hearing Officer's findings that on more than one occasion in 
October 2004, the Department informed Appellant that his "previously held position" remained open 
and available for him to return to. Finally, the record supports the Hearing Officer's findings that 
at the end of the one-year period of allowable LTD leave, Appellant failed to provide the 
Department with any direct statement or substantive information that he was not longer disabled due 
to severe psychopathological illness or that he was even able to return to work within the time frame 
required by statute. (Step 5 Decision at^ Jf 19-10 at 4) 
After careful review of the evidentiary record, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's 
detailed factual findings. The Hearing Officer's findings are clearly supported by substantial 
evidence and support the Departments position that its termination of Appellant's employment was 
for just cause and to advance the good of the public service. 
n. LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT'S TERMINATION 
OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT FOR FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK 
WITHIN ONE YEAR AS REQUIRED BY DHRM RULE R-477-7-17 
On appeal, Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer erred by legally concluding that in 
reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment, the Department had complied with State 
personnel rules governing LTD leave. Indeed, on appeal, Appellant essentially argues that the 
Department never offered to place Appellant in his "previously held position" of Legal Enforcement 
Counsel DDL Rather, Appellant argues that in reality the Department offered to place Appellant in 
the very different or lesser position of "Administrative Law Judge," a position with functions 
Appellant was disabled from performing. Based upon these factors, Appellant argues that the 
Department violated State personnel rules regarding LTD and that the Hearing Officer erred in 
upholding the Department's decision. 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the State's personnel 
rules regarding LTD leave, the Board finds Appellant's arguments on this issue sophistic. In so 
holding, the Board relies heavily on the evidentiary record which establishes not only that prior to 
his dismissal from employment, Appellant never provided the Department with any information that 
his psychopathological illness had ameliorated to any degree, but also that holding unemployment 
hearings has always been a core function of the Department's Legal Enforcement Counsel HI 
position. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Board first notes that the conditions upon which an employee 
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may return to work for the State after being on LTD leave can be found at DHRM rule R477-7-17, 
which provides that: 
(3) Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include: 
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one 
year of the last day worked, the agency shall place the 
employee in the previously held position or similar 
position in a comparable salary range provided the 
employee is able to perform the essential functions of 
the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 
* * * 
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one 
year after the last day worked, the employee shall be 
separated from state employment. 
A plain reading of this rule establishes that as a condition precedent, before an employee can 
be placed in a previously held position, or any other position for that matter, the formally disabled 
employee must be "able to return to work." (Id.) In the instant case, the evidentiary record 
establishes that at no time prior to his dismissal from employment did Appellant provide the 
Department with any information or give the Department any reason to believe he had recovered 
from the medical condition upon which his LTD leave had been granted. (Tr. I at 60-62; Tr. II at 
90-94) To the contrary, Appellant's counsel, in a letter dated October 4, 2004, actually and 
unambiguously informed the Department that Appellant's illness was unchanged and that he in fact 
remained "disabled...." (Ex. G-24) 
The Board is also not persuaded that Appellant's assertion in this October 4,2004 letter that 
he deemed himself "able to perform the essential functions of... the position he occupied prior to 
demotion" was sufficient to inform the Department that he was "able to return to work." (Id.) This 
is especially true in light of Appellant's repeated assertions that he "remained disabled" and had 
been diagnosed as totally disabled due to a psychopathological illness and in light of the fact the 
Department had specifically required that before placing Appellant back to work he would need to 
provide a medical release. (Ex. A-5) 
Regarding the Department's requirement that Appellant provide a medical release indicating 
that he was able to return to work, the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer that the Department 
would have been derelict had it "failed to require a medical release clearing Grievant [Appellant] 
to work following his diagnosis of pathological illness and the consequent total disability." (Step 5 
Decision at 9) Indeed, to suggest that the Department not need obtain such a release would require 
the Agency to have "amnesia" with respect to Appellant's disability, a requirement this Board is 
unwilling to impose on the Department (Id.) (See Harris v. Harris & Hart, Inc., 206 F.3d 838 (9th 
Cir. 2000)) 
Moreover, the Board finds Appellant's assertion that he was able to perform the essential 
functions of the position he held "prior to his demotion" to have been intended to advnace his then-
pending litigation rather than as a factual statement of his ability to return to work. As discussed in 
note 5, supra, this issue has been resolved, and the Board notes that Appellant was in fact never 
demoted and that holding unemployment hearings had always been a "core function of a Legal 
Enforcement Counsel HI position." (Step 5 Decision at 6-7; Blauer v. Utah Department of 
WorJforce Services, 128 P.3rd 1204, 1210-1211 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)13 Indeed, the record 
establishes that the only position Appellant was ever determined to be disabled from and for which 
he was on LTD leave for was the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position and none other. 
Even if the Court of Appeals decision regarding core functions of the Legal Enforcement 
Counsel IQ position were ignored, the evidentiary record clearly establishes in and of itself that 
holding unemployment hearings is a core function of a Legal Enforcement Counsel III position. The 
evidence establishes that in addition to Appellant, other individuals employed by the Department 
in the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position have consistently been required to hold 
unemployment hearings as part of their regularly assigned duties. (Tr. I at 84, 86-87) In addition, 
because performing such hearings is a core function of the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position, 
the Department has always been free to increase the percentage of time that Appellant or any other 
individual in this position is assigned to conduct unemployment hearings in accordance with DHRM 
rule R477-3-3. This rule allows management to assign or modify tasks or responsibilities within a 
position for any reason deemed appropriate by the Department. 
Based upon careful review of the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision, as well as the 
evidentiary record and the parties' briefs on appeal, the Board finds the Hearing Officer correctly 
applied the relevant personnel policies and rules in deciding to uphold the Department's termination 
of Appellant's employment. The evidentiary record clearly establishes that the Department offered 
13This decision by the Utah Court of Appeals is entitled to res judicata consideration in this action. 
Youren v. Tintic School DisU9 86 P.3d 771 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004) 
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to place Appellant his "previously held position" in conformance with DHRM rule R477-7-17. 
Moreover, the evidentiary record supports the Hearing Officer's findings that prior to his dismissal 
from employment, Appellant never provided the Department with any information that his 
pathological illness had ameliorated to any degree and thus was "able to return to work." Indeed, 
the record establishes that in August 2005, when the evidentiary hearing was held in this matter, 
Appellant was still receiving LTD benefits and had not yet received a written release to work based 
upon recovery from his psychological illness. (Tr. II at 294-298) 
Finally, substantial evidence produced at the evidentiary hearing in this matter establishes 
that performing unemployment insurance hearings was and continues to be a core and necessary 
function of the Department's Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position and a requirement regularly 
assigned to individuals employed in this position. Because holding such hearings is a core function 
of this position, the Department was well within its rights to assign Appellant, or any other employee 
in that position, to perform such hearings on a substantially full time basis. (DRHM rule R477-3-3) 
Based upon these factors, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision sustaining the 
Department's termination of Appellant's employment. In upholding the Hearing Officer's Step 5 
Decision, the Board finds that in accordance with DHRM rule R477-7-17, the Department offered 
Appellant his previously held position to which Appellant was either unwilling or unable to return. 
Therefore, this Board finds that the Department properly terminated Appellant's employment in 
accordance with DHRM rule R477-7-17(3)(c) which directs, in mandatory terms, that an employee 
who is "unable to return to work within one year of the last day worked... shall be separated from 
state employment." (emphasis added) 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After thoroughly 
reviewing the evidentiary record and carefully studying the legal issues raised by the parties before 
this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision for the reasons set forth herein and 
denies Appellant's appeal to this Board. The Board finds the Hearing Officer's decision to be 
reasonable and rational and supported by substantial evidence. The Board further finds that the 
Hearing Officer correctly applied all pertinent rules and policies in rendering his decision. Based 
upon the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Board finds the 
Department's decision to be based on just cause and to advance the good of the public service and 
thus upholds the Hearing Officer's decision sustaining Appellant's dismissal. 
It is so ORDERED this 28th day of June 2006. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Kevin C. Timken, Acting Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Teresa N. Aramaki, Member 
Richard R. McDonald, Member 
evin C. Timken, Acting Chair 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Ciwfe, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
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F I L E C O P Y 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORINBLAUER 
Grievant and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency and Respondent 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF THE BOARD'S DECISION 
AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Case No. 9 CSRB 83 
On Thursday, July 20, 2006, Grievant, through his representative, Tom Cantrell, filed a 
document with the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) entitled "Request for Reconsideration of 
Decision and Final Agency Action." (Request for Reconsideration) This document states that 
Grievant "submits to the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), this Request for Reconsideration 
of Decision and Final Agency Action in accordance with Utah Administrative Code, Rl 3 7-1 -22( 10), 
and Utah Code § 63-46b-13, Utah Administrative Procedures Act" These administrative and code 
sections relate solely to requests for reconsideration. 
Utah Code Arm. § 63-46M3 states: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review 
by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with 
the agency 
(Emphasis added) 
DECISION 
The Decision and Final Order was issued on June 28, 2006. Appellant's Request for 
Reconsideration was filed on July 20,2006 - 22 days after the Decision and Final Agency Action 
was issued. Thus, the CSRB has no alternative but to deny Appellant's Request for Reconsideration 
as it was untimely filed. 
It is so ORDERED this 27th day of July 2006. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 27th day of July 2006,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing 
Denial of Appellant's Request for Reconsideration of the Board's Decision and Final Agency 
Action in the matter of Lorin Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services to the following: 
HLorin Blauer 
460 North 900 East 
Bountiful UT 84010-2824 
(2) I sent an E-mail of the original document to the following: 
^ r i an Blake 
Paralegal 
Office of the Attorney General 
BBLAKE@utah.gov 
^JbAnne Campbell 
Human Resources Director 
Utah Dept of Workforce Services 
JCAMPBE@utah.gov 
^Tom Cantrell 
National Administrative Law Advocates 
advocates@tomcantrell.com 
irfani Downing 
Executive Director 
Utah Dept. of Workforce Services 
TDOWNING@utah.gov 
v^Phihp S. Lott 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
PHILLOTT@utah.gov 
Jennifer Wakefield 
Human Resources Specialist 
Utah Dept of Workforce Services 
WENDYPETERSON@utah.gov 
and (3) I faxed a copy of the original document to: 
ST Philip S. Lott 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
801366.0150 
Claudia L. Jones 
Legal Secretary 
